1. Ian Brownlie, Principles of International Public Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979.
2. Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation State in Latin America, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.
3. Michael Mann, ‘the Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms and Results’, Archives Européenes De Sociologie, 25, 1984, pp. 185–213.
4. Hillel Soifer, ‘State Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement”’, In Comparative International Development, 43, 2008, pp, 231–255.
5. Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In Bringing the State Back In, Edited by Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and Skocpol, Theda, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985.
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8. Daniel Byman and Stephen Vanevera, ‘Why They Fight: Hypotheses on the Origins Of Contemporary Deadly Conflict’, Security Studies, 7, (3), 1998, pp. 1–50.
9. Ibid., pp.1.50.
10. Jonathan Di John, ‘Conceptualizing the Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature’, Working Paper, no. 25 – Development as State-Making.
11. Olivier Nay, ‘Fragile and Failed States: Critical Perspectives on Conceptual Hybrids’, International Political Sciences Review, 34 (3), 2013, pp. 326–341.
12. UK Department For International Development, “Why We Need to work more Effectively in Fragile States, UKDID, 2005, < https://gsdrc.org/document-library/why-we-need-to-work-more-effectively-in-fragile-states/>.
13. Di John Defines Revolution Wars as sustained violent conflict between governments and Politically Organised Challengers that seek to overthrow the Central Government, replace its Leaders, or seize Power in one Region.
14. Di John defines Ethnic Wars as ‘sustained violent Conflict in Which national, ethnic, religious, or other Communal Minorities Challenge Governments to Seek Major Changes in Their Status’.
15. Di John defines Adverse Regime Changes as ‘major, abrupt shifts in patterns of governance, including state collapse, periods of severe elite or regime instability, and shifts away from democratic to authoritarian rule’.
16. Ibid., p.85.
17. Ralph Wilde’, the Skewed Responsibility Narrative of the ‘Failed States’ Concept’, Journal of International and Comparative Law, 9(2), 2003, pp.426–429.
18. William Zartman Collapsed States, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995.
19. Robert Rotberg, ‘The New Nature of Nation-State Failure’, the Washington Quarterly, 25, (3), 2002, pp. 85–96.
20. Scott Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa, Cornell University Press, 2015..
21. Interviews conducted by the Author, January 2021.
22. Eigenstate Porter. John Edward Porter, and Jeremy Weinstein, ‘Rebuilding Weak States’, Foreign Affairs, February 2005, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2005-01-01/rebuilding-weak-states>.
23. UK Department for International Development, “why we need to work more effectively in Fragile States’, 2005.
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25. UNHCR, ‘The Refugee Brief’, 11 March 2020, <https://Bit.Ly/3clvs0w>.

War and mass displacement have made it difficult to obtain accurate statistics on population and ethnic and religious ratios. However, before 2011 the country had a population of around 23 million: between 87–90 percent Arab; between 7–10 percent Kurd and around 3 percent Armenian and Turk. Almost three-quarters of this population (74 percent) was Sunni; about 13 percent Alwait and shiite; about 10 percent Christian; and around 3 percent Druze and other religions. See Hamid Bayat. Abbas Ahmadi.Yashar Zaki, and Javad Etaat’, Explaining The Pattern of Relationships of Regional Powers in The Syrian Geopolitical Crisis’, Geopolitics Quarterly,16 (57), 2020.

26. UNHCR, ‘Ranking of the Major Source Countries of Refugees as of 2019– 2020’, <https://www.Statista.Com/Statistics/272999/Refugees-By-Source-Country/>.
27. Zartman Collapsed States.
28. William Zartman, Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse. In: W. Zartman (Ed.) Collapsed State: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp. 1–11.
29. Dawisha Adeed and William Zartman, Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State, London: Croom Helm, 1998.
30. Torres Moreno and Anderson, Michael, ‘Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction’, Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments Team Policy Division, and U.K. Department for International Development.
31. Badie Bertrand and Pierre Birnbaum, the Sociology of the State, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983.
32. Kenneth Dyson, the State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution, Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1980.
33. Gianfranco Poggi, the Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction, San Francisco: Stanford University, 1978.
34. Max Weber, H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Essays in Sociology, New York: Galaxy, 1958.
35. Monika François and Inder Sud, ‘Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and Failed States’, Development Policy Review, 24, (2), 2006, pp. 141–160.
36. Mohammad Barout, Syria in the Last Decade: The Dialectic of Stagnatian and Reform, Doha: Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 2012, p.63.
37. Mark Gasiorowski and Sean L. Yom, The Government And Politics of the Middle East and North Africa.

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38. Ibide., pp.55–56.
39. CIA, ’Syria Fact book: Central Intelligence Agency”, 2020, < https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/syria/>.
40. Interviews with Groups of Aleppo’s Families, February 2021.
41. 202Interviews with groups of Aleppo’s families, February 2021.
42. Interview with Syrian journalist Zakaria Zakaria, January 2022.
43. Azmi Bishara, Syria-A Way of Suffering to Freedom: Attempt at the current History, Doha, Arab Centre for Research for Policy Studies, 2013, p.201–218.
44. Orient, ‘Field Events in Daraa in 2015’, December 2015,< https://Bit.Ly/2GIU1iz>.
45. Elaheh Koolaee, Yahya Zarrinnarges. Ziba Akbari, ‘Causes of The Failure of The State in Syria (2010–2019)’, Geopolitics Quarterly, 16, (4), 2021, p.299.
46. Samer Bakkour, ‘The Syrian Presidential Elections, Syria’s Presidential Elections: International Understanding Suspended And Economic Collapse’, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2021, <https://Carnegieendowment.Org/Sada/84744>.
47. Seema Kassab, The Resiliency Of Authoritarianism: The Assad Regime Of Syria, Eastern Washington.

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48. Robert Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States, Causes Of Indicators, in State and State Weakness in Time Of Terror, edited by Robert Rotberg, Washington DC, World Peace Foundation/Brookings Institution, 2003, pp-40–45.
49. Koolaee, ‘Causes of The Failure of The State in Syria, p.299.
50. CIA, ‘Syria Fact book: Central Intelligence Agency’.
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53. Koolaee, ‘Causes of the Failure of the State in Syria’.
54. OCHA, ‘Wadi Barada’, 30 January 2017, < https://Bit.Ly/370Q5E1>.
55. Koolaee, ‘Causes of the Failure of the State in Syria’,pp.288–309.
56. Barout, p,319.
57. Bethany’, Hospitals Become the Front Line in the Syrian Civil War’.
58. Koolaee, ‘Causes of the Failure of the State in Syria’, pp.288–309.
59. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘About OCHA Syria’, 2019, <https://www.Unocha.Org/Syrian-Arab-Republic/Aboutocha-Syria>.
60. The Fund for Peace, ‘Failed State Index’, 2006, < http://www.Fundforpeace.Org/Programs/Fsi/Fsindex.Php>.
61. Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States, Causes of Indicators, pp-40–45.
62. Ibide., pp-40–45.
63. Mirzaei Jegarloe. S. Kazemi and E Motaghi, ‘Identity Consequences of Arab Spring and Islamic Awaking in Southwest Asia; Case Study: Syria’, Geopolitics Quarterly, 13, (45), 2017, pp73–100.

UNHCR, ‘Statista in Ranking of the Major Source Countries of Refugees as of 2019– 2020’.

64. Savaş Eker, ‘Savaş Olgusunun Dönüşümü: Yeni Savaşlar Ve Suriye Krizi Örneği’, Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi, Turkish Journal Of Middle Eastern Studies, 2,(1), 2015, pp.31-66.
65. Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States, Causes of Indicators, pp-40–45.
66. Stathis Kalyvas, ‘New and Old Civil Wars: a Valid Distinction?’, Word Politics, 54, (1), 2011, pp.114.
67. Raymound Hinnebusch, ‘Syria: from “Authoritarian Upgrading” to Revolution’? International Affairs,88, 2012, pp.95–113.
68. Christopher Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East, New Haven, Yale university Press, 2016, p. 2.
69. Baba Amr neighbourhood was the first part of the city that experienced huge ‘forced displacement’, and this was because it was the first besieged neighbourhood to resist regime incursions. In the city, displacement subsequently transformed from a consequence of conflict into a driver of it.
70. The number of Sunnis dropped substantially (from 43 percent to 19 percent) but the number of minorities increased substantially; Alawites increased from 25 percent To 37 percent; Christians from 8 percent to 13 percent; and Ismaili’s from 0.2 percent To 0.3 percent.
71. Walid Al-Faris, the Great Siege: seven Hundred Days of Siege, Doha, The Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 2015, p.33–38.
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73. The Syrian Revolution Network, ‘Al-Sabil Neighbourhood Massacre’, 11 February2012, <https://Bit.Ly/3gfbnhd>.
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75. Abd al-Rahman Khader, ‘Seven Years after the Houla Massacre: A Survivor Tells the Tragedy’, 25 May 2019, < https://bit.ly/34BIRnf>.
76. The UN secretary-general, denounced the massacre as a ‘flagrant violation of international law’, and a U.S spokesperson condemned it as ‘despicable’. William hague, the british foreign secretary, demanded a strong international response and the French president Francois Hollande said the military option could ‘no longer be excluded’.
77. Khader, ‘Seven Years after the Houla Massacre’.
78. Interviews with many families of Homs, January 2022.
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86. Phillips, the Battle for Syria..
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